Post Wall, Post Square by Kristina Spohr

Author:Kristina Spohr [Spohr, Kristina]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: HarperCollins Publishers
Published: 2019-09-11T17:00:00+00:00

Under the tank: Vilnius, 13 January 1991

Gorbachev and the Kremlin denied complicity in the carnage,[114] but Chernyaev had no doubt where the blame lay. ‘Never did I think that the inspiring processes started by Gorbachev could come to such an ignominious end,’ he wrote in his diary on 13 January. ‘I am worn out by the confusion, and, alas, the arbitrariness of our work; some kind of “spontaneity” in our affairs … All of this led to the “spontaneous” actions of commandos and tanks in the Baltics and ended in bloodshed … The Lithuanian affair has finally ruined Gorbachev’s reputation and maybe his post as well.’[115]

Chernyaev was disgusted by the public charade at the Supreme Soviet next day. ‘Pugo and Yazov made stupid, false, boorish speeches. Gorbachev himself spoke after the break, and his speech was pathetic, inarticulate, and full of pointless digressions. And no policy. It was sickening – plain hypocritical evasion. There was no answer to the most important question. The speech was worthy neither of the former Gorbachev, nor of the present moment, when the fate of his entire five-year cause is being decided. It was embarrassing and sad to hear.’ The analysis by another veteran liberal adviser, Georgy Shakhnazarov, was both subtle and apt: Gorbachev was on the one hand a political radical and on the other a Soviet apparatchik.[116]

The evidence, though confused, strongly suggests that ‘Gorbachev knew about and supported at least a limited military solution. Most likely, he did not expect numerous casualties and did not order the deaths of innocent people, but he embraced the solution that led to this outcome.’[117] In the end, however, the issue of direct responsibility is secondary: appearance counted for more than reality. The image of the bloody Baltic crackdown was a disaster for Gorbachev. His credibility as a principled political leader – the apostle of perestroika and glasnost, the man who had lectured the world at the UN on universal values – was now called into question. And even if he wasn’t to blame directly, there remained perhaps a more troubling question: had he lost control of his country? Was the world’s second superpower descending into anarchy?

And was a new Russia rearing its head? On the very day – 13 January – that blood was spilled in the streets of Vilnius, Boris Yeltsin was on a scheduled visit to the Estonian capital, Tallinn, in order to sign a mutual security pact between the Russian Republic and the three Baltic States. This was a calculated act: supporting Baltic independence aspirations but also defying Gorbachev and his central authority. Their 3 + 1 pact called for each of the four republics to respect the sovereignty of the others, to refrain from recognising any non-elected government among them and to come to one another’s aid should the Soviet government use force against them. In addition, all four leaders issued a joint appeal to the UN for intervention in the Baltic crisis.[118]

Yeltsin’s presence in Estonia probably prevented further shooting that day. He condemned the massacre in Vilnius and explicitly recognised their self-declared independence.

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